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CONTENTS
The New Economy should not be discounted as a
temporary stock market phenomenon, but should
be recognized as a real and sustainable phenom-
enon. The basic feature of the transition towards
the New Economy is the rising importance of
information—both as output and input good—in
virtually all sectors of the economy.
It would be fallacious to interpret the New Econ-
omy as a sector-specific phenomenon. Informa-
tion increasingly constitutes a crucial input factor
both in modern and traditional industries, and the
information content of a final output is continu-
ously rising throughout the economy.
Present technological change, which is based
upon modern information and communications
technologies and on biotechnology, measures up
to the industrial revolutions of past centuries. It
would be premature, however, to identify funda-
mental trend shifts in aggregate productivity
growth, because certain measurement issues are
still unsettled and the observation period is still
too short.
Private firms must develop new business strate-
gies in order to cope with potential market failure
resulting from the properties of information
goods as public goods, network goods, and ex-
perience goods. Bundling and versioning of prod-
ucts, attracting free riders, and —above all—
establishing reputation are among the most im-
portant business strategies for the New Economy.
The New Economy can be expected to reshape
the structure of firms and industrial relations. On
the one hand, reduced transaction costs will foster
small, network-oriented niche suppliers. On the
other hand, the New Economy will create sub-
stantial firm-size economies of its own—resulting
from low marginal costs of information goods
and competitive advantages from bundling and
the exploitation of reputation. In addition, new
types of incentive contracts that can serve to
monitor knowledge-intensive activities will gain
ground.
Since human capital will replace physical capital
as the crucial factor of production, improving the
qualifications of the labor force is essential to
successfully cope with adjustment challenges of
the New Economy to the labor market.
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Expectations and hopes about the New Econ-
omy gave rise to exciting high tides in the stock
market over the past year. At times, the stock
market value of Yahoo, a search engine with
about 1,000 employees, even exceeded the ones
of Boeing or Daimler-Chrysler, which employ a
more than hundred-fold number of workers. The
dot.coms of the New Economy seemed to
promise the king's road to wealth and fortune,
where one would not need to care about sound
business strategies, appropriate price-earnings
ratios, positive cash-flows, and other relics of
the old economy.
Enthusiasm for the New Economy vanished
with the turn of the tide at the NASDAQ and
other new markets. For many observers, the
New Economy now spells as speculative bub-
bles, which do not contain any solid economic
substance. Such a reaction is comprehensible —
but misleading. Highly developed countries —
and other countries as well — are nowadays
facing a fundamental transition of economic
structures, which reaches far beyond mere stock
market fluctuations.
This paper attempts to explore the economic
essence of the New Economy both from a mac-
roeconomic and a microeconomic perspective.
Part 2 discusses the concept of the New Econ-
omy as applied in this paper and briefly com-
ments upon changing relative scarcities. Part 3
surveys the productivity debate on the New
Economy and puts it into a historical perspec-
tive. Part 4 is concerned with the response of
private suppliers of information goods to differ-
ent types of potential market failure. Part 5 is
addressed to changes in the size and structure of
firms. Part 6 presents some provisional policy
conclusions, which partly rely upon the analyses
presented here and partly establish a link to ad-
ditional research contributions from the Kiel
Institute to the entire project on the New Econ-
omy.
2 A New Paradigm:
From Physical Capital
to Human Capital
The basic feature of the transition to the New
Economy
1 is the rising importance of informa-
tion — both as output and input good — in vir-
tually all sectors of the economy. In the course
of this development, the economy fundamen-
tally changes its face, but these changes can still
be grasped by well-established concepts of eco-
nomic theory.
2 The New Economy is mainly
driven by modern information and communica-
tions technologies (ICT). They give access to
almost any kind of information at almost unlim-
ited speed at almost any place on earth.
The transition to the New Economy is ac-
companied by structural change where those in-
dustries are gaining the upper hand that exten-
sively take advantage of modern information
and communications technologies. It would be
fallacious, however, to interpret the New Econ-
omy as a sector-specific phenomenon. Informa-
tion increasingly constitutes a crucial input fac-
tor both in modern and traditional industries,
and the information content of final output is
continuously rising throughout the economy. It
is not so much the displacement of old by new
industries which establishes the New Economy,
but a rise in the information content of goods
and in the information intensity of production
processes thoughout the economy. Change may
take place at different speed in different indus-
tries, but it will eventually embrace the whole
economy.
Information has turned into a cheap and ubiq-
uitous production factor which increasingly sub-
stitutes traditional production factors (Siebert
2000). A similar development took place two
hundred years ago, when scarce and expensive
energy from animal and human muscles was re-
placed by fossile energy from coal which could
* Almost-synonyms are the "information economy," the
"knowledge-based economy," the "weightless econ-
omy," or the "virtual economy," whereas the "Internet
economy" or the "e-conomy" are subsets of the New
Economy.
2 'Technology changes. Economic laws do not"
(Shapiro and Varian 1998: 2).be converted into mechanical energy by the
steam engine (Wrigley 1988). This technologi-
cal change paved the way for the first industrial
revolution, as the energy intensity of production
instantaneously increased, old industries were
reshaped, and new industries emerged.
Presumably, the world economy presently
faces a structural reshaping and reshuffling
which compares to structural change two centu-
ries ago. This development is driven by shifts in
the relative scarcity of production factors. In the
agricultural society, land was scarce and labor
was abundant. With the advent of the industrial
society, land lost its dominant position and was
replaced by physical capital which was com-
bined with the newly abundant factor energy. As
a result, economic wealth shifted from landed to
industrial magnates.
In the New Economy, information is the
cheap and abundant factor. It can be expected
that the crucial scarce factor will be human
capital, i.e., the ability to convert information
into knowledge (Figure 1). Of course, physical
capital will not disappear, but it will lose its
dominant position. Production in the New Econ-
omy will still require physical capital — in the
same manner as industrial production requires
land. But relative scarcities will substantially
change at the expense of physical capital. Will
economic wealth pass over from industrial mag-
nates to intellectuals? Probably not.
Figure 1: Paradigm Shift
OLD ECONOMY NEW ECONOMY
M physical goods • information goods
3 The Macroeconomic Perspec-
tive: A New Kondratieff?
Today's technological change predominantly
rests upon the basic invention of the micro chip.
Its development reaches far back into the past
(first transistor in 1948; first integrated circuit in
1970), but the diffusion of microelectronics sig-
nificantly gained speed only recently — espe-
cially in the ICT area. At present, there is almost
no industry which can do without microelec-
tronic equipment or microelectronic compo-
nents.
In the view of Danny Quah (1999), biotech-
nology constitutes the second corner-stone of the
New Economy, because it also bears the poten-
tial of becoming a general-purpose technology
for a large variety of industries. This view is
shared by several natural scientists, for instance
by Rodney Brooks (2000), who is in charge of
the MIT Institute on Artificial Intelligence and
who argues that the human body will mainly
consist of easily replacable parts within some
decades. If this vision comes true, the transition
to the New Economy would be driven by two
basic technologies which match the basic tech-
nologies of the first industrial revolution and
which could well initiate a powerful and sus-
tainable growth and productivity push.
This view is illustrated in Figure 2, which —
in the sense of Schumpeter — relates long-term
economic growth to basic inventions. It is still
an open question whether economic growth ac-
tually takes place in long waves and whether pe-
riods of rapid growth are caused by technologi-
cal or sociological events. Anyway, Schumpeter
himself was convinced that technological inven-
tions are at the roots of so-called Kondratieff
cycles. He distinguished between the industrial,
the bourgeois, and the neomercantile Kondratieff
(Schumpeter 1939). There are diverging appre-
ciations about the basic inventions of the indi-
vidual Kondratieffs, and Figure 2 only presents
a selection which is mainly based upon Landes
(1969, 1998), Mokyr (1990), and Jewkes et al.
(1969) and which could easily be extended. The
dating of the Kondratieffs follows van Duijn
(1983: 23).Figure 2: Kondratieff Cycles
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Actual empirical work on the growth per-
spectives of the New Economy mainly concen-
trates on the issue of whether the expected pro-
ductivity push of the New Economy can already
be statistically observed (for a survey, see Stiroh
1999). Average labor productivity growth in the
United States has significantly accelerated in the
late 1990s, whereas in other industrial countries
a comparable push is still missing (Table 1).
Table 1: Annual Growth Rate of Labor Productivity
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There is a lively debate about whether inter-
national productivity differentials can be traced
back to different methods of price adjustment. In
the United States, quality improvements of
electronic devices are evaluated by hedonic re-
gressions which indicate that the price of com-
puters and peripheral equipment has decreased
by 80 percent over the 1990s, whereas German
price statistics, which are based on traditional
concepts of inflation adjustment, reveal a price
decline of only 20 percent (Deutsche Bundes-
bank 2000a).
According to OECD calculations, however,
measured annual economic growth in Germany
would increase by less than 0.1 percentage
points if ICT investment had been deflated by
the U.S. methodology (Schreyer 2000). More-
over, the measurement bias is completely irrele-
vant for France, Sweden, and Denmark, where
national statistical offices apply the same he-
donic regressions approach as in the United
States (Scarpetta et al. 2000).
3 Hence, the
statistically observed growth and productivity
differentials between North America and Europe
can be regarded as a real phenomenon. At the
maroeconomic level, the New Economy has ob-
viously not (yet) arrived in Europe (van Ark
2000; Funk 2000).
It is far from clear whether the acceleration of
productivity growth in the United States itself
reflects the advent of the New Economy or
whether it is caused by other factors — for in-
stance by favorable macroeconomic conditions.
For solving this issue, several authors have tried
to identify the impact of ICT investment on pro-
ductivity growth since the mid-1990s.
- According to Gordon (2000), an acceleration
of multi-factor productivity growth can only
be observed in a few investment goods in-
dustries, whereas the remaining 88 percent of
the U.S. economy even had to face a decel-
eration.
- Oliner and Sichel (2000) are more optimistic.
They identify an increase of productivity
growth not only in computer production, but
also in those industries which extensively
make use of ICT. Hence, their results tend to
support the New Economy hypothesis.
- A broad productivity push across industries is
also observed by Jorgenson (2001) and
Jorgenson and Stiroh (2000).
4 On the other
However, unobserved quality improvements in general
are reaching a considerable size. According to the
Boskin Report, economic growth in the United States
is underestimated by about 1.1 percentage points per
year, because quality improvements are insufficiently
taken into account (Boskin et al. 1996). Corresponding
calculations for Germany indicate an underestimation
of about 0.8 percentage points per year (Hoffmann
1998).
Jorgenson (2001) provides an excellent survey of the
productivity debate on the New Economy.hand, they are puzzled by the low rate of pro-
ductivity growth especially in those service
industries which make intensive use of ICT
and which could be expected to establish the
core of the New Economy.
A major reason for the different assessments
of the New Economy effect in productivity
growth stems from different concepts of cyclical
adjustment. In the view of Gordon, almost half
of the productivity acceleration can be traced
back to the business cycle, whereas Oliner/
Sichel and Jorgenson/Stiroh completely refrain
from cyclical adjustment.
It should further be noted that none of these
studies has solved the identification problem,
which is well known from traditional growth ac-
counting and which makes it impossible to un-
ambiguously separate technology-induced pro-
ductivity growth from productivity effects of
factor accumulation without restrictive theoreti-
cal assumptions. As Gundlach (2001) demon-
strates, total factor productivity in the U.S.
economy has increased by 1.8 percent under the
assumption of Hicks neutrality, by 2.7 percent
under Harrod neutrality, and by 5.4 percent un-
der Solow neutrality over the period from 1996
to 1999. There is no unequivocal criterion for
applying one or the other concept. And there is
even no reason why actual technological pro-
gress should follow any of these neutrality con-
cepts at all.
All in all, macroeconomic productivity analy-
ses about the New Economy still provide mixed
evidence. Presumably, the observation period is
simply too short for identifying trend shifts. At
present, euphoric appraisals of New Economy-
induced productivity boosts would be as pre-
mature as a complete denial of new growth and
productivity potentials.
The significance of the New Economy should
not be evaluated, however, exclusively on the
basis of its visible impact on productivity. It
could well be imagined that the transition to the
New Economy would even be accompanied by a
temporary productivity slump. Restructuring of
productive capacities requires withdrawing
scarce resources from traditional activities,
while the establishment of new activities may be
subject to certain gestation delays. Old struc-
tures might have to break apart before new
structures can emerge.
At present, it appears to be more promising,
therefore, to concentrate on the microeconomic
implications of the New Economy, which are
analyzed in the remainder of the paper. The next
section is concerned with new business strate-
gies for information goods. Markets for infor-
mation goods represent only a fraction of the
New Economy, but this fraction can be regarded
as the most dynamic and most exciting one.
4 Bumblebees Don't Fly:
Business Strategies for
Information Goods
Natural scientists have proven that bumblebees
are unable to fly. They are too stout and heavy,
their wings are much too short, and their aero-
dynamics is completely misfitted.
5 Fortunately,
bumblebees are not aware of these problems.
In a sense, information goods are like bum-
blebees:
- They are public goods, where optimal pricing
would require a fine-tuned personal price dis-
crimination and where it is difficult to ex-
clude consumers who are unwilling to pay.
- They are network goods, where the establish-
ment of functioning markets requires over-
coming certain thresholds and where compe-
tition exhibits winner-take-all properties.
- They are experience goods, which cannot be
inspected prior to purchase and which will be
purchased no more after inspection.
Economists are as worried about these market
failures as biologists are worried about bumble-
bees. Fortunately, market participants do not
seem to care, and the markets for information
goods are rapidly expanding.
On average, a bumblebee weighs almost a gram, has a
wing area of a square centimeter, and cruises at a
speed of about 1 m/s, which is technically inconsistent
(Zetie 1996).4.1 Information as a Public Good
Information can be regarded as the prototype of
a public good. The utilization of information for
production or consumption does not reduce its
available amount for other users; i.e., there is no
rivalry in utilization. Furthermore, it would be
socially inefficient to exclude any potential user
whose marginal utility from the specific infor-
mation is above zero. Private suppliers would
only produce an optimal amount of information
if they were able to charge prices that equal the
marginal utility of each consumer (Varian 1984:
253).
In reality, such a perfect price discrimination
(known as Lindahl pricing) is almost impossible
to achieve. It would require consumers to reveal
their true preferences and to refrain from inter-
personal arbitrage, which can easily be accom-
plished in the case of information goods because
they can be duplicated almost without cost. Un-
der competitive conditions, therefore, it should
be expected that the supply of information goods
is suboptimal. If free-rider behavior is dominant,
it can even be expected that private markets for
information goods cannot be established at all,
since suppliers would be unable to cover their
costs.
Apparently, the markets of the New Economy
do not follow these theoretical considerations.
The problem of real life seems not to be the
short supply of information, but the "informa-
tion overload." Nevertheless, the blossoming of
information markets should not be misinter-
preted as an indicator of the irrelevance of po-
tential market failure in the area of public goods.
Private suppliers have to develop specific busi-
ness strategies which allow them to earn suffi-
cient profits from the provision of information
goods.
Bundling of public and private goods is one
of the most important business strategies for this
purpose (Varian 1999). For instance, freely
available information on web-sites is often
financed by providing advertising space to other
firms.
6 As earnings from selling advertising
space can be expected to be positively related to
the quality of the offered information good, the
provider of the web-site has strong incentives to
offer valuable information, although nobody is
willing to pay for the information itself. The
strategy of bundling does not completely cure
the market failure, but it at least allows to estab-
lish viable markets for information goods which
could hardly be sold on their own at a positive
price.
An interesting variant is the bundling of dif-
ferent types of information goods. As Bakos and
Brynjolfsson (1999, 2000) have demonstrated,
such a strategy allows "economies of aggrega-
tion" to be gained, which are not available from
private goods. A simple numerical example may
help to clarify the point: Let there be two con-
sumers (A and B) and two information goods
(W and S), say a word processor and a spread-
sheet calculator. A is willing to pay a price of 3
for W and 2 for S, and B's reservation prices are
2 for W and 3 for S. If the two goods are offered
separately, the price will be 2 for each and total
earnings will amount to 8. If both goods are
bundled together, each bundle can be sold at a
price of 5, which would raise total earnings to
10. If it is further assumed that fixed production
costs for each information good are equal to 4.5,
then bundling would even constitute a necessary
condition for the private supply of these goods.
In essence, bundling of information goods
mimics personal price discrimination. Bakos and
Brynjolfsson show that such a business strategy
is both profitable and welfare-enhancing if the
marginal costs of production are low — this
condition is surely met by information goods.
A further approach to price discrimination is
"versioning" (Varian 2000). Under this strategy,
an information good is offered in different
qualities to different types of consumers, even if
the producer has to bear certain additional costs
of designing a low-end version of the product.
A popular example cited by Shapiro and Varian
(1998) is the strong price differential for
Windows NT for servers and Windows NT for
The reader might object that advertising itself consists
of information and should thus also be regarded as a
public good. It should be noted, however, that Yahoo
and others do not sell advertising, but advertising
space on their web-sites, which is undoubtedly a pri-
vate good with strong consumption rivalries.PCs, although the two systems are technically
almost identical. Another example is the free
Internet version of Netscape and its priced
offline version stored on a CD and accompanied
by a handbook and access to technical support.
Shapiro and Varian (1998: 62) have specified
several cases where there are promising oppor-
tunities for the versioning strategy. They suggest
to discriminate between patient and impatient
users, casual and experienced users, business
and home users, student and professional users,
occasional and frequent users, lay and profes-
sional users, and certain other types of customer
groups (see also Smith et al. 2000; Brynjolfsson
and Smith 2000).
All in all, bundling and versioning are cer-
tainly no perfect substitutes for Lindahl pricing,
but they at least contribute to the establishment
of markets and facilitate the flight of the bum-
blebee.
4.2 Information as a Network Good
Further potentials for market failure are related
to the fact that many information goods are net-
work goods. The utility of such goods for the
individual consumer not only depends on their
technical properties, but also on the total number
of consumers. The classical example from the
old economy is the telephone set, which is of no
use at all if nobody else owns a telephone. Each
additional telephone user generates additional
utility for each other user without being com-
pensated — i.e., there is a network externality
which results in suboptimal incentives for join-
ing the network. As a consequence, existing
networks will tend to be of suboptimal size
(Katz and Shapiro 1985, 1994).
And what is more, new networks may fail to
be established as long as certain thresholds are
not surmounted: a telephone network with three
participants will probably not be worth its costs,
and there are no incentives for a fourth partici-
pant to join if her positive network externality
will not be compensated for by the other partici-
pants. In addition, technological progress may
be hampered if new network technologies are
unable to gain acceptance over existing, tech-
nologically inferior networks, which already
have of a broad installed base. Such path de-
pendencies (Arthur 1989; David 1985) may well
impede the development of new markets and
may thus retard aggregate economic growth.
7
A typical example of network goods in the
New Economy are word processors, which are
valued by consumers not only by their technical
capacities but also by their market shares, be-
cause most consumers are interested in cooper-
ating with other word processor users. Network
effects were at the heart of the recent antitrust
case against Microsoft. It was argued that
Microsoft's free-of-charge supply of its Internet
Explorer would unfairly undermine the market
position of Netscape. The Explorer would
enlarge its installed base to such an extent that
future users would not consider buying Netscape
any longer (see, e.g., Sachverstandigenrat 2000:
142 f.).
The QWERTY system of typewriters, the
victory of VHS against Betamax as VCR stan-
dard, and the dominance of DOS/Windows over
Macintosh are further examples of technologi-
cally inferior network goods driving technologi-
cal superior ones out of the market. However,
the work of Liebowitz and Margolis (1994,
1999) has raised considerable doubts against the
view that these cases are really explained by
network externalities and path dependencies.
They point out that empirical tests with ergo-
nomically superior keyboards did not yield
higher typing speed than QWERTY keyboards.
Moreover, Betamax has never been able to pro-
duce cassettes with a capacity that is able to tape
a complete movie or football match. And the
Mac system, finally, was more expensive than
Windows and was not backward-compatible.
The Macintosh-Windows case also illustrates
the importance of adapting business strategies to
the conditions of the New Economy. In the old
economy, producers are well advised to exclude
those customers who are unwilling or unable to
pay. Macintosh followed this strategy by pro-
tecting its software against unlicensed copying.
Microsoft also declared unlicensed copying ille-
For a graphed illustration of this line of argument, see
Klodt (1997: 302).gal, but did not truly prevent it. As a conse-
quence, many non-business users installed their
Windows software without paying licence fees.
Hence, Microsoft was able to attract many free
riders who created substantial network external-
ities for all users. The market value of Windows
programs was thus raised, and Macintosh soft-
ware was eventually almost completely driven
out of the market.
8
The dominance of network effects for market
structures and competition intensity basically
depends upon the relative size of switching costs
between different networks. According to
Shapiro and Varian (1998: 103), high switching
costs and related lock-in effects are quite com-
mon in markets for information goods. Such
switching costs may result from technical in-
compatibilities, but also from repeated contracts
or product-specific learning costs. As technol-
ogy proceeds, producers are increasingly able to
shape the extent of switching costs and to utilize
them for their individual business strategies
(Besen and Farrell 1994).
As a rule, customers are always interested in
low switching costs in order to prevent mo-
nopolistic exploitation. For producers, however,
the appropriate strategy depends on their market
position: High switching costs establish signifi-
cant barriers to entry and can thus protect the
market position of dominant firms. New en-
trants, by contrast, should strive for low switch-
ing costs which are less intimidating for new
customers and which allow them to benefit from
externalities of related networks.
But even monopoly positions in network
markets may be contested. In the recent past, in-
creasing numbers of professional users have
switched from Windows to Linux, which is
continuously being improved by many software
specialists around the world and which provides
all these improvements and its basic source code
freely available on the Internet. In a sense,
Microsoft has been beaten at its own game: Pre-
viously, the installed base of Windows was ex-
tended by illegal copying. Today, the installed
8 As Stolpe (2000) has shown, many other software pro-
ducers also renounce protection against illegal copy-
ing, because they rely upon the extension of their mar-
ket share by attracting free riders.
base of Linux is extended by its free availability
on the Internet. Its open source code enables
continuous product improvements by many
anarchically organized users who are fed up
with the Microsoft monopoly.
4.3 Information as an Experience Good
The distinction between experience goods and
inspection goods was introduced by Nelson
(1970). Customers cannot evaluate the quality of
experience goods in advance, because their rele-
vant characteristics are only revealed via usage.
If the proof of the pudding is in the eating, then
pudding can be regarded as an experience good.
Another — and more important — experience
good is information. This property may give rise
to further market failure in the New Economy.
Markets for experience goods are in general
more difficult to establish than markets for in-
spection goods. In the case of information
goods, further difficulties arise from non-rival-
ries as discussed in Section 4.1. The combined
result of these two types of market imperfections
is the so-called information paradox, which has
already been described by Kenneth Arrow
(1962: 171): "There is a fundamental paradox in
the determination of demand for information; its
value for the purchaser is not known until he has
the information, but then he has in effect ac-
quired it without cost." The traditional market
mechanism, which leads to a contract if the
market price does not exceed the reservation
price, will fail because the purchasers do not
know their own reservation price prior to con-
tracting.
The information paradox can be dissolved by
vertical integration. For instance, most firms
prefer to carry out their research and develop-
ment activities in-house instead of relying upon
external contracts, because the results of R&D
— typical information goods — are difficult to
trade. Moreover, many strategic alliances on
R&D of the 1980s and 1990s have long been de-
stroyed either by dissolution or by merger and
acquisition.
Another approach to the information paradox
is to create an atmosphere of trust between buy-10
ers and sellers. Trust may be established via re-
peated contracts or a high reputation of sellers.
For instance, the decision to buy a certain news-
paper will not depend on the content of the indi-
vidual copy, because nobody would buy this
copy who already knows its content. Instead, the
buying decision will be based upon the content
of previous copies or upon the general reputa-
tion of the newspaper. Similar decision mecha-
nisms are commonly applied for choosing Inter-
net search engines, chartered accountants, or
business consultants. As the information content
of virtually all types of goods tends to rise in the
course of structural change, even motorcars or
washing machines are gradually converting into
experience goods. Hence, reputation can be re-
garded as the crucial factor for gaining a com-
petitive edge in the New Economy.
5 Firm Structures in Flux
The New Economy does not only reshape mar-
ket structures but also the structure of firms. At
present, it seems difficult to assess which new
trends will emerge and which trends will even-
tually gain the upper hand.
On the one hand, the new information and
communication technologies can be expected to
favor small firms which are able to cooperate
with other suppliers and customers in flexible
networks. Such networks require intense and
frequent communication, and the relative costs
of communication are considerably reduced by
the new technologies. Moreover, the physical
capital requirements are in general quite low in
the New Economy. The relevance of these con-
siderations is demonstrated by the large number
of technology-oriented start-ups and by the high
dynamics of technology-intensive segments of
the stock markets.
In addition, the hierarchies within firms are
flattened by lean management and outsourcing
of activities outside the own "core competen-
cies." These observations are well in line with
the transaction cost approach of Coase (1937)
and Williamson (1973, 1989), which basically
explains the optimal size of firms by the relative
level of transaction costs under different organ-
izational structures. As transaction costs of co-
ordinating economic activities over the market
— which mainly consist of information and
communications costs — are declining with the
transition to the New Economy, average firm
size should decline, too.
On the other hand, the New Economy creates
new firm-size economies of its own. As dis-
cussed above, information goods are subject to
large economies of scale, because marginal costs
are close to zero. In addition, the business
strategies of bundling favors large firms
(economies of aggregation). Furthermore, net-
work externalities require surmounting critical
masses, which is easier for large firms than for
small ones. Finally, reputation can be regarded
as a quasi-public good within firms, which can
be exploited in different plants and different
business fields without substantial additional
costs.
These new firm-size economies may help to
explain the current wave of mega-mergers,
which started around 1995 and which is largely
motivated by the exploitation of reputation and
other headquarter services on globalizing world
markets (Kleinert and Klodt 2000).
9 Typical
headquarter services are the establishment of a
brand name, the provision of R&D results, and
the development of efficient management and
marketing systems — all of them involve infor-
mation goods which are of increased importance
in the New Economy. In this view, today's
merger wave does not generate the dynosaurs of
tomorrow, but fits well into the adjustment re-
quirements of the New Economy, where firm-
size economies resulting from the internal provi-
sion of information goods are predominant. All
in all, it seems premature to expect that average
firm size in the New Economy will generally be
lower than in the old economy. At present, it ap-
pears to be most likely that there will emerge a
co-existence of specialized, network-oriented
The term "headquarter services" was coined in the
theory of multinational firms which is based upon in-
dustrial economics and the new trade theory (see, e.g.,
Helpman 1984; Markusen 1984; Markusen and
Venables 1998).11
niche suppliers and horizontally integrated,
globalized large firms.
A similar dichotomy can be expected for the
development of industrial relations:
- On the one hand, network-oriented firms look
for flexible, team-oriented workers who are
ready for project-related short-term contracts
and do not insist upon life-long employment.
- On the other hand, the decisive asset of the
firm in the New Economy is the human capi-
tal of its employees. This asset needs to be
handled with care and needs to be retained.
Moreover, work effort is difficult to control in
human-capital-intensive activities, which calls
for worker participation in long-term profit
development, for instance by long-term stock
options (Rajan and Zingales 2000).
1
0
It is difficult to assess, therefore, whether
work contracts in the New Economy will be
more or less mutable than in the old economy.
Most likely, industrial relations will become in-
creasingly disperse with a variation that corre-
sponds to the variation in firm size. There
should be no doubt, however, that the transition
to the New Economy will be accompanied by
rising qualification requirements across all skill
levels, which will further reduce the employ-
ment opportunities of low-skilled workers
(Siebert 2000).
6 Economic Policy for the
New Economy
The previous analysis has shown that bumble-
bees' life is not easy, but manageable.
1
1 Their
For a survey on incentive contracts and their role in
motivating skilled workers, see Gibbons (1998).
The reader who is eager to learn how real bumblebees
manage to fly should read Heinrich (1979). Cross-
species analyses for 28 birds and insects and 9 aircraft
have revealed, however, that the efficiency of bumble-
bees in airborne transport is in fact extremely low.
They exhibit a cost-of-transport index (COT) of 19.33,
whereas fruitflies (drosophilae) achieve a COT of
8.50, and the Boeing 747 is travelling at a COT of
0.19 (Videler 1992). According to this source, the
average bumblebee (bombus) weighs about 0.5 grams
and achieves a cruising speed of 4 m/s. The difference
environment is governed by non-rivalries, net-
work externalities, and the information paradox,
where marginal cost pricing and other traditional
business strategies are most likely to fail. Ap-
propriate business strategies for information
goods include bundling and versioning, attract-
ing free riders, surmounting critical masses, and
exploiting lock-in effects. Above all, establish-
ing and retaining reputation is the key factor for
gaining a competitive edge in the New Econ-
omy.
The new environment provides ample space
for various species of bumblebees. The New
Economy gives rise to substantial firm-size
economies, but also offers rich opportunities for
small, flexible, and network-oriented niche sup-
pliers. In addition, relations between queens and
workers are going to be reshaped. Presumably,
several new types of incentive contracts will
gain ground, which can serve to monitor knowl-
edge-intensive activities.
The New Economy is subject to any kind of
market failure. This does not imply, however,
that the visible hand of government should try to
improve the performance of the invisible hand.
Direct government intervention does not con-
stitute the appropriate response to static alloca-
tive inefficiencies in markets for information
goods. Bumblebees have to learn how to fly on
their own account. There will be many trials and
many errors, but any attempt of government to
prevent private agents from errors would un-
dermine dynamic efficiency, which counts in the
long run. Nevertheless, economic policy should
take notice of the fundamental structural change
that is associated with the transition to the New
Economy, because new challenges will arise to
public agents as well.
The policy implications of the New Economy
are not explicitly addressed in this paper: They
are analyzed, however, in other studies from the
Kiel Institute related to our project on the New
Economy. This work suggests that economic
policy will have to be adjusted especially in the
following areas:
to the parameters given by Zetie (1996) may be due to
the fact that there are many different species of bum-
blebees.12
Central banks will probably have to adapt
monetary policy, because productive capaci-
ties will be restricted increasingly less by
physical capital and increasingly more by
human capital (Gern 2001).
The systems of social security will have to
face an erosion of their traditional financial
base which heavily relies upon payroll taxes.
As conventional labor contracts will continu-
ously be replaced by project-oriented short-
term contracts and various new forms of self-
employment, social security contributions
should be detached from earned income, and
self-reliance, and individually designed social
security packages should be strengthened
(Siebert 2000).
Fiscal policy will have to take into account
the limited potential for taxing virtual trans-
actions and should try to directly price public
infrastructure wherever possible. In addition,
the tax burden will have to be relocated from
internationally mobile investors to immobile
factors of production and to consumption
(Stehn 2001).
Competition policy has to recognize that tradi-
tional concepts of antitrust will run dry in
markets which are governed by winner-take-
all competition. In such markets, the control
of market shares of dominant firms is no
longer adequate. Instead, the focus should be
laid on closed standards and high switching
costs between networks, which may establish
artificial barriers to entry and may reduce the
contestability of markets for information
goods (Klodt 2001).
- International policy coordination should de-
velop new tools of global governance, be-
cause the New Economy largely ignores na-
tional borders. Frictionless international flows
of goods, services, and production factors re-
quire consistent, transparent, and enforceable
international rules. For this purpose, behind-
the-border practices and norms and standards
should be included more comprehensively
into the WTO framework (Piazolo 2001).
- Educational policy should endow workers
with the key qualifications for the New Econ-
omy. In periods of rapid structural change,
basic skills are more relevant than specialized
skills. In addition, the principle of life-long
learning should be strengthened, which is
even more important in the light of an aging
population (Foders 2001).
- And last but not least, labor market policy
should enable people to take advantage of the
rich opportunities of the New Economy. It
should give way to flexible forms of em-
ployment and should try to prevent a digital
divide between online and offline workers
(Christensen 2001).
Ready or not, the New Economy is on its
way. Economic policy will not be able to slow
down or to control structural change. But it can
facilitate adjustment processes and thus reduce
avoidable frictions.
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